Pakistan encountered a significant rise in terrorism, with 573 in 2021, 715 in 2022, and 1210 in 2023.
ByAmbassador M. Alam Brohi | August 2024
We should have a broad idea of what constitutes terrorism as we know it today. Violence has existed in various forms and manifestations in human society. The emergence of the Baader Meinhof Gang in West Germany, the Irish Republican Army in Ireland, ETA in Spain, and the Red Brigades in Italy are quite recent examples of group violence in modern Europe. Group terrorism, state terrorism, liberation and secessionist movements and revolts against illegitimate or autocratic rules, and ideological and revolutionary warfare are so inextricably intertwined that scholars and experts and even the United Nations have so far failed to separate chaff from wheat, evolving a definition of terrorism that could evoke a broad consensus.
Terrorism, according to Dr. Hassan Askari, is “the method or the theory behind the method whereby an organized group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aim chiefly through the systematic use of violence” and that “it is premeditated violence propelled by ideological or political causes.” The Institute of Strategic Studies, London, defines terrorism as the “use of violence, often against the people not directly involved in a conflict, by groups operating clandestinely, which generally claim to have high political or religious purposes, and believe that creating a climate of terror will assist attainment of their objectives.” In the recent past, the terms international terrorism and international organized crime were introduced to cover the hijacking of airplanes, drug trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, currency faking, and the flow of funds to terrorist organizations.
The causes stimulating terrorism are multiple and well-grounded in political, economic, socio-cultural, religious, and ideological aims. Terrorism in Pakistan, as viewed in the context of the above definitions, does not have a long history. The country is currently confronted with two leading and deadly terrorist organizations, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Their history could be traced back to the early 1990s and the mid-2000s. The other religion-induced terrorist groups that were active in Balochistan and Sindh about a decade and a half ago - Ramzan Mengal and Shafiq Mengal groups and IS-K targeting Hazara community and Shias pilgrims seem to have gone out of resources or merged with the TTP.
The first Afghan war (1979-89) witnessed mushroom growth in the number of trained Mujahideen. In his book “Afghanistan and Pakistan,” former Foreign Secretary Riaz Muhammad Khan cites their number as around 85,000 in 1986. We also witnessed a considerable hike in the seminaries spread over KPK and Balochistan, which were funded by our Arab brothers to recruit a large number of mujahedeen. This was the period in which the seeds of militancy were sown. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the USA withdrew from the region lock, stock, and barrel, and the foreign jihadists were disowned by their countries of origin. They were all allowed to settle in our tribal belt. The rise of the Taliban and their five-year rule gave a fillip to the Jihadist spirit of the Mujahidin hibernating in North and South Waziristan. The Taliban allowed Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda to return to Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda considered all the Muslim rulers toeing the U.S. policies, hampering Sharia-based governance, as liable for removal from power. This belief provided additional stimuli for jihadists.
Genesis of TTP
In the second Afghan war (2002-2021), the Taliban were bombed and driven out of Kabul. They just crossed over the border and melted away in the Pashtun population. Under pressure from the U.S., the first military operation- Rah-e-Nijat - was launched against the Taliban and their affiliates, deploying over 70,000 troops in North Waziristan in 2004. There was no breakthrough. The regime signed a pact with the militants, which also did not work. In the meantime, inspired by the Afghan Taliban and the foreign militants, a new militant organization, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, was formed with Mahsuds from North Waziristan in command and the followers of Sufi Muhammad and battle-hardened Chechens, Uzbeks, and Uighurs as its hardcore fighters (according to Ambassador Munir Akram). The force was mainly based in Malakand and Swat Divisions where Mullah Fazalullah, aka Mullah Radio, was running camps to train Mujahid for jihad in Kashmir.
The TTP was further strengthened by the disgruntled militant organizations purportedly fighting for the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir. These included Hizb ul Mujahidin, Harkat ul Jihad Al Islami, Harkat ul Mujahidin, Harkat ul Ansar of Masood Azhar and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba commanded by Hafiz Saeed Ahmed. According to Riaz Muhammad Khan, barring the Harkat ul Jihad Al Islami, an affiliate of Jamaat Islami of Jammu and Kashmir, all the other groups created in 1990-1991 were based in Pakistan. Barring Lashkar Tayyaba and Harkat ul Ansar, all other groups joined TTP as General Pervaiz Musharraf banned them in the wake of an attack on the Indian Parliament. The terrorist attacks on civilians and security targets in Pakistan reached a crescendo from 2003 to 2013, killing over 70000 civilians and over 2400 security personnel.
The rise of the Taliban and their five-year rule gave a fillip to the Jihadist spirit of the Mujahidin hibernating in North and South Waziristan.
The TTP targeted and killed many ANP leaders during the 2007 elections. The provincial coalition government of ANP wanted a peaceful resolution of this conundrum by signing a pact with the TTP. As in the past, the pact allowed space for the TTP to consolidate its position and advance to Swat and other settled districts, which posed a direct threat to Islamabad. This was a blunder on the part of the political leadership. The army had to launch yet another operation – Rah-e-Rast - against the TTP in 2009 to rid the settled regions of the militants. The operation was a tremendous success. However, the civilian government was slow in extending its writ through good governance and effective policing.
The Birth of BLA
The BLA is a recent addition to the terrorism cobweb. The death of Sardar Akbar Bugti in a military raid and his burial under the shadow of guns in 2006 angered Baloch, challenging the writ of the state. This was the fourth armed rebellion in Balochistan and has since been raging in the province. The BLA, the armed wing of the Baloch insurgents, has been involved in violent attacks on security check posts and the murder of civilian workers from Punjab and Sindh, Chinese citizens working on development projects in Balochistan, and terrorist attacks on the Chinese facilities in Karachi.
With the appointment of General Raheel Sharif as the Army Chief, the third operation, Zarb-e-Azb, was launched in 2014 in the wake of the cowardly attack on the Army Public School (APS) in December of that year. Despite our clear warnings, the Afghan regime allowed the TTP to cross over the border to have safe havens in adjoining districts of Afghanistan. The heinous attack on the APS forced the political leadership to adopt the military-sponsored National Action Plan (NAP). While the army successfully carried out the operation against the militants, destroyed their nerve centre, and flushed them out of the South and North Waziristan, the civilian governments failed to implement the 20-point NAP with even its main points establishing National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA), reforming the judiciary and madrasahs, monitoring the terrorists designated elements of the banned organization under the fourth schedule of the Anti-Terrorist Act.
This gave time to the militants to regroup and intrude in the tribal belt, necessitating the fourth operation, Rad-ul-Faasad, by his successor, General Qamar Bajwa. The operation Rad-ul-Fasaad cornered the militant organization, almost ending its terrorist attacks in the country. We had high hopes pinned on the Afghan Taliban taking over Kabul in August 2021 to neutralize the TTP as a payback for the help extended to them by Pakistan. However, we were left disappointed. Contrarily, the Taliban advised a ceasefire with the TTP, allowing them to return and rejoin their families for a peaceful life. Our civilian and military leadership naively believed the Afghan Taliban and committed the blunder notwithstanding the past record of their broken promises. It had time to regroup and resume its terrorist attacks. This time, the enemy is well-equipped, more motivated, committed, and agile.
The Afghan regime has washed its hands off this conundrum. In 2023, Pakistan encountered a significant rise in terrorism, with 573 in 2021 to 715 in 2022 and 1210 in 2023, according to a recent UN Report on Global Terrorism. Do we have any other option than a full-fledged military operation? We can hardly afford to have the hot pursuit of TTP into Afghanistan, given the status of our relations with other immediate neighbours. Has the civilian and military leadership exhausted all options to convince the Taliban regime to review its relations with the TTP, relocating its camps deep in Afghanistan, as advised by some political leaders? Would an intelligence-based operation against terrorists be more effective? The military operation would be a long haul. Have the federal and provincial governments worked out plans for the internally displaced people (IDPs) and the establishment of the civilian writ in the affected regions? These are some basic questions that the civil and military leadership would have to answer. We need to have a national consensus on the issue.
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